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Abstract Behavioural research suggests that the intensity with which policy instruments 
indicate a direction of desired behavioural change affects how target populations respond 
to them. However, comparative research on policy instruments focuses on their calibra-
tion, restrictiveness, density and formal intensity, but does not account for the degree to 
which they specify the particular policy goal. Moving beyond nudging and “command and 
control” approaches, this paper adds the dimension of explicitness to existing taxonomies 
of policy instruments. The explicitness of an instrument results from two questions: first, 
does the instrument specify a direction of behavioural change? Second, does the instru-
ment attach valence to this behaviour? The paper proposes a stepwise measurement proce-
dure and links explicitness with policy outcomes. A comparative case study of organ donor 
policy in Switzerland and Spain illustrates how accounting for the explicitness dimension 
can improve our understanding of policy instruments and their effectiveness.
Keywords Behavioural public policy · Explicitness · Policy design · Policy instruments · 
Organ donation
Problems, power and policy instruments
It is wise and prudent for policy makers to be much more careful about understand-
ing the behavioural aspects of both policy tools and targets and ensure these match 
up in an effective compliance regime.
M. Howlett (2016, p. 21).
Policy instruments communicate messages about overarching policy objectives to tar-
get groups. Scholarly interest in the messages to citizens engrained in public policies is 
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increasing (Shafir 2013; Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Policy tools have an informational 
component that affects how they work in practice (John 2016). Scholars of responsive reg-
ulation, behavioural public policy and administration point to the huge potential of behav-
iourally informed intervention as effective intervention strategies (Alemanno and Sibony 
2015; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2017; Oliver 2013). Surpris-
ingly, however, this insight has not yet made its way into the comparative study of policy 
instruments. Although compliance with public policies is a key concern, we know surpris-
ingly little about the precise link between policy instruments and outcomes (e.g. Gofen 
2015; Knill et al. 2012; see Schaffrin et al. 2015 and Weaver 2014 for recent overviews). 
To improve our understanding of regulatory effectiveness, this paper adds the dimension of 
explicitness to existing taxonomies of properties of policy instruments. It illustrates differ-
ent levels of explicitness and their link with policy outcomes using the case of organ dona-
tion regulation.
Policy instruments are a set of techniques used by public actors to ensure support and to 
either effect or prevent social change (Vedung 1998: 21). “Policy instruments” and “policy 
output” are closely intertwined concepts. I follow Schaffrin et al. (2015: 258) who “take a 
perspective where policy instruments are regarded as the core concept of policy output but 
also consider the respective content of the instruments focusing on its setting and calibra-
tions”. I shall suggest that policy instruments can be calibrated differently in terms of their 
explicitness. Explicitness is a dimension or property of policy instruments which refers to 
their content.
Ideally, the state assesses the desirability of a given regulatory goal—for example, an 
increase in the availability of donor organs—and then chooses policy instruments that are 
suitable to achieve this goal (Jordan et al. 2005). However, public policy instruments are 
more than just means of addressing problems (Bagchus 1998). Public policy instruments 
also reveal a theorization of the relationship between the government and the governed, 
and set out the values and interests protected by the state (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007). 
Specifically, the use of coercion (at the formal and substantive level) reflects the inten-
sity with which governments attempt to influence target group behaviour—for instance, 
the consent to donate organs (Schaffrin et  al. 2015). Moreover, regulatory density refers 
to the extent and amount of regulations. The double-edged nature of policy instruments—
addressing problems and exerting power—is, however, only partly mirrored in the extant 
taxonomies.
Existing research emphasizes the density, formal intensity and substantive intensity 
of policy instruments (Adam et  al. 2015; Engeli et  al. 2013; Studlar and Burns 2015). 
Essentially, formal and substantive intensities describe the power relationship between the 
government and the target population (Bauer and Knill 2014; Hood 2007; Howlett and 
Cashore 2009; Sager 2009; Schaffrin et al. 2015; Vedung 1998). These existing taxonomies 
focus on regulatory content either as the governments’ resources at hand, or as the relation-
ship between public authorities and private actors (Schaffrin et al. 2015). However, none 
of these categories captures the notion that each of these policy instruments can be neutral 
(objective) or involve a judgement of desirable behaviour (Vedung 1998: 33).
Let me illustrate this. While both Switzerland and Spain had fully non-coercive aware-
ness-raising campaigns for organ donation in 2010, the sermons differed substantially in 
the message they communicated. Spain issued the slogan “Donate your organs, donate 
life”. This slogan promoted organ donation very explicitly, yet non-coercively as the 
desired behaviour. In contrast, the Swiss campaign issued slogans like “Organ donation 
yes or no”, “I know what I want”, “I decide myself” and “Does somebody else know what 
you want?” The Swiss government emphasized the procedural aspect of taking a decision 
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regarding organ donation, but without involving any statement about the desired direction 
of this decision. Against this background, this paper argues that, while highly relevant, 
neither the notion of “instrument calibrations” nor the dimensions of density or intensity 
capture the fact that policy instruments differ in the explicitness with which they define a 
desired direction of behavioural change relative to a given technical policy goal.
The study proposes that existing taxonomies of the substantial intensity of policy instru-
ments be extended to include the dimension of explicitness. It puts forward two main 
arguments: first, the explicitness dimension captures whether and how policy instruments 
define an underlying policy goal. On the one hand, policy instruments may or may not indi-
cate a direction of behavioural change (Engeli and Varone 2011). On the other hand, this 
behavioural change may or may not be attributed positive or negative valence (Kahneman 
and Tversky 2000; Levin et al. 1998). Not only do information measures or “nudges” dis-
play differing degrees of explicitness, but so do more coercive measures (John 2016; Nel-
son et al. 1997). By decoupling the degree of explicitness from the kind of instrument, this 
study provides a tool to understand the effects of the intensity of policy instruments, tran-
scending existing notions of “command and control” or “nudging”. Second, indicating a 
direction of desired behavioural change affects how target groups respond to policy instru-
ments (Cialdini 2003; Johnson et al. 2005; Shafir 2013; Thaler and Sunstein 2008; Weaver 
2014). A qualitative comparison of organ donation policies in the two cases of Switzer-
land and Spain illustrates these claims (Manatschal and Thomann 2011). The explicitness 
dimension provides additional insights that the degrees of density and restrictiveness of the 
instruments cannot offer.
The next section first reviews existing perspectives on policy design. I discuss how the 
new dimension of explicitness can complement these perspectives, how it can be meas-
ured, and how it might be linked with policy outcomes. The remainder of the article pre-
sents the research design and results, discusses the role of context, values and culture, and 
exemplifies explicitness in two other policy sectors.
Explicitness and the intensity of policy content
Policy goals are generally recognized as an essential component of policy designs (e.g. 
Howlett and Cashore 2009). However, the literature features a variety of understandings 
and measurements of the concept of policy output (Schaffrin et al. 2015). The first, a holis-
tic understanding, stresses that policy output includes both “ends” and “means” at differ-
ent levels of abstraction (Howlett and Cashore 2009; Howlett 2009). Here, “policy output 
is composed of three levels of abstraction: the goals of policies, the instruments used to 
achieve these goals, and the settings in which the policies are applied” (Schaffrin et  al. 
2015: 258). Policy settings lay out goals through specific requirements. In accordance with 
these settings, means are calibrated in order to achieve policy goals (Howlett 2009). Dif-
ferent “calibrations” of policy designs provide criteria to classify arrangements of policy 
tools in view of how means are specified in order to achieve policy goals (Howlett 2009).1 
While useful for thinking about the choices made by policymakers, this approach does not 
1 In addition to calibrated restrictiveness, directness refers to the degree of state involvement in output 
delivery; automaticity to the degree to which new implementation structures are created; and visibility to 
budgeting and policy review activities.
 Policy Sci
1 3
comparatively conceptualize different extents to which settings are specified, instruments 
are calibrated, and goals are defined in the first place.
According to the second, a comparative approach, we can distinguish the density and 
intensity of policy instruments across time, sectors and countries. Regulatory density tells 
us about the formal extent and breadth to which governmental activities address a certain 
policy area (Bauer and Knill 2014). This dimension captures the amount of government 
activity in terms of the degree of regulatory penetration, complexity and internal differenti-
ation (Knill et al. 2012). Turning to the content (intensity) of government activity, substan-
tial intensity denotes the restrictiveness of policy output in terms of the level (instrument 
settings) and scope (personal/substantive/temporal) of state intervention. Restrictiveness 
refers to the substantial freedom left to policy addressees, or the generosity of the services 
or resources provided (Bauer and Knill 2014: 33; Knill et  al. 2012: 430; also discussed 
as government intervention, authority, stringency, permissiveness or coerciveness by 
Hood 2007; Howlett and Rayner 2007; Sager 2009; Schneider and Ingram 1990; Vedung 
1998).2 Finally, formal intensity refers to factors that affect the probability to effectively 
achieve regulatory requirements, and define the consequentiality of non-compliant behav-
iour (enforcement, administrative and procedural capacities) (Adam et al. 2015; Knill et al. 
2012).
In accordance with this second approach and other than Howlett and Cashore (2009), 
I separate policy goals from formal and substantial means and label the latter policy 
instruments (see Schaffrin et al. 2015).3 Schaffrin et al. (2015) identify five types of pol-
icy instruments in the current literature, which they differentiate along the restrictiveness 
dimension using Vedung’s (1998) tripartite classification of sticks, carrots and sermons. 
To simplify things, I use Vedung’s trichotomy. The three categories distinguish analytically 
relevant ways of exercising coercion for the purpose of illustrating the notion of explicit-
ness, though they do not capture the more fine-grained degrees of restrictiveness (Sager 
2009) or differentiations of different policy instruments (Hood 2007).
Sticks (regulations) are authoritative restrictions on actions or directives as how to act. 
They limit the choices available to the individuals. Sticks manifest themselves as regu-
latory measures (Schaffrin et  al. 2015) or “authority” (Hood 2007; Howlett and Rayner 
2007). Carrots are economic or non-monetary policy instruments. They make an action 
easier or more difficult by providing or depriving material resources. Incentives make 
actions less expensive (e.g. subsidies), whereas disincentives make them more expensive 
(e.g. taxes)—yet the addressees are not obligated to take the measures involved. Both mar-
ket-based approaches and public investment are carrots, called “treasure” by Hood (2007) 
and Howlett and Rayner (2007). Finally, sermons are voluntary appeals by means of infor-
mation or exhortation, characterized by the absence of obligation. Sermons are soft instru-
ments according to Schaffrin et  al. (2015) or “nodality” according to Hood (2007) and 
2 Restrictive instruments limit the activities, freedom or behaviour of the target group. Permissive instru-
ments contain no or only loose restrictions concerning a specific behaviour, or grant the target groups 
opportunities for action (Euchner et al. 2013).
3 Instruments serve to achieve goals, but goals exist independently of instruments. Instruments specify a 
desired direction of behavioural change with various levels of explicitness, but they do not constitute or 
contain the behavioural change (the goal) itself.
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Howlett and Rayner (2007).4 Carrots and sticks can themselves display different degrees of 
restrictiveness.
The present study argues that policy instruments formulate objectives with varying 
degrees of insistence (Bagchus 1998; Howlett and Cashore 2009; Howlett 2009; Weaver 
2014). As such they include the government’s position about the desired technical goal of 
the policy. The content of policy instruments thus also entails differing degrees of explicit-
ness, meaning the extent to which single instruments specify a desired direction of behav-
iour relative to a given policy goal. The central analytic question here refers not to the 
exertion of power, but to whether and how technical policy problems are defined. Jordan 
et al. (2005) classify different instrument types according to whether or not this is the case. 
Howlett and Cashore (2009) and Howlett (2009) acknowledge that every output specifies 
goals through instrument calibrations. However, the authors do not tell the reader the dif-
ferent degrees to which this can be observed. To fill this gap and bridge, to a degree, the 
two approaches to policy outputs, I argue that any instrument type can in fact specify the 
policy goal in a more or less explicit manner, see Fig. 1. This figure is a simplified repre-
sentation of ideal-types; reality is usually more complex.
I will now define the two aspects of explicitness: goal definition and valence attribution, 
in a positive or negative direction. Based on the example of organ donation policy, I pro-
pose a stepwise procedure of comparatively measuring positive and negative explicitness, 
first for sermons, then for carrots and sticks, and discuss the relationship between explicit-
ness, density, intensity and nudging.
Fig. 1  Explicitness of policy instrument content. Author’s illustration, based on Thomann and Manatschal 
(2016). Italics: examples of respective instruments (not exhaustive)
4 Vedung (1998: 38) argues that organizational strategies as a fifth type (“framework policies” according 
to Schaffrin et al. (2015), sometimes also called “adhesives”) are a prerequisite for the application of policy 
instruments, but not a policy instrument in the narrow sense. If organizational settings cannot meaningfully 
be classified along the dimensions of permissiveness/coerciveness and explicitness, they are not analysed as 
policy instruments here.
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Measuring explicitness
In its most basic form, explicitness is a dichotomy: either a desired direction of behavioural 
change is defined, or it is not. Differing degrees of explicitness need to be defined in the 
specific context of the policy through three consecutive steps: identifying policy outcomes 
and target groups, goal definition, and valence attribution. Using the example of organ 
donation policy, I now propose one possible procedure for measurement using these three 
steps. Neither goal definition nor valence attribution need necessarily be conceptualized in 
a dichotomous way.
Step 1. Identifying policy outcomes and target groups. This first step starts with identify-
ing the problem(s) that a policy addresses. In order to resolve this problem, policy instru-
ments seek to make certain actors—the addressees of the policy—change their behaviour. 
This behavioural change, which policy instruments define more or less explicitly, is the 
policy outcome. The beneficiaries of the policy are the actors who are affected by the prob-
lem and hence benefit from the behavioural change, see Fig. 2 (Knoepfel et al. 2011).5 The 
sets of addressees and beneficiaries often overlap, but they differ analytically. For example, 
to reduce environmental emissions (goal), car producers (addressees) need to comply with 
standards (instruments) to produce low-emission vehicles (behavioural change). This will 
then benefit the population (beneficiaries) in terms of improved health.
In the case of organ donation policy, the technical problem is clear: more and more 
patients in need of transplants are waiting for a donor organ (Flückiger 2010; Matesanz 
and Dominquez-Gil 2007). The initial pool of potential donors consists of patients with 
a formal brain death diagnosis or non-heart-beating patients. Once a potential donor has 
Fig. 2  Policy instrument, outcome and target groups. Based on Knoepfel et al. (2011)
5 For a specific policy problem, we can usually identify several policy outcomes. Analysing how a given 
policy output targets different outcomes helps scholars understand the calibration of policy designs. I focus 
here on explicitness relating to only one policy outcome, while acknowledging that organ donation policy 
also has other, non-technical goals such as preserving individual freedom.
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been identified, the next of kin are asked for their consent or refusal to donate organs. A 
potential donor turns into an effective donor as soon as at least one solid organ has been 
retrieved. The number of refusals as a share of total requests for organ donation is the big-
gest obstacle to higher donor rates. The technical solution lies in lowering these refusal 
rates (e.g. Dunkel 2011; Roels et al. 2010; Shafer et al. 2006; Simillis 2010; Simpkin et al. 
2009).
Figure  2 illustrates that implementing agents who put policy instruments “on paper” 
into practice may adapt these instruments (Lipsky 1980/2010). Hence, most instruments 
target more than just one actor group—with differing degrees of density, intensity and 
explicitness. For example, the Spanish government obliges all hospitals to run a quality 
control programme (stick; obligatory). However, this programme is intended as an infor-
mational measure (sermon; voluntary) for hospital staff to improve organ donation pro-
cesses. I classify policy instruments according to the degree of authority and explicitness 
exercised on the final target population (Sager 2009: 540), namely the medical staff and 
next of kin involved in the family decision-making process.
Step 2. Goal definition. Framing theory tells us that the way in which policy instruments 
articulate particular problems is a decisive factor in terms of how citizens react to these 
outputs (Kahneman and Tversky 2000; Nelson et al. 1997). Based on the definition of the 
problem above, we can identify whether an instrument indicates the envisaged direction of 
behavioural change (explicit) or not (non-explicit). In the case of organ donation, the ques-
tion is whether an instrument specifies as the intended behavioural change an increase in 
the consent rates to organ donation.6
To ensure comparability, we need to distinguish positive explicitness (in favour of 
a given goal) and negative explicitness (contra a given goal). For example, comparative 
studies of AIDS prevention programmes would reveal that South Africa’s campaign under 
president Thabo Mbeki quite explicitly discouraged effective prevention, whereas West-
ern European countries explicitly emphasized prevention as the intended behaviour. Dif-
ferent instruments might target different, contradictory goals; or some instruments might 
explicitly target a goal in a positive direction, and others, in a negative direction—resulting 
in incongruent or contradictory policy designs or instrument mixes (Howlett and Rayner 
2007; Howlett 2009). An instrument is more explicit if it aims at positively influencing 
the donor’s decision, as did the Spanish information campaign. Conversely, a non-explicit 
instrument represents a neutral or absent official position, as did the Swiss information 
campaign (Dunkel 2011; Flückiger 2010). In such cases, the government avoids taking a 
position on the morally contested issue of organ donation (Engeli and Varone 2011).
In reality, policy designs are mixes, which can make it conceptually challenging to 
determine a single policy goal that allows for the operationalization of “directional explic-
itness”. However, it is still possible to assess “mere explicitness” levels (independently of 
6 It can be useful to differentiate between the notion of a “goal” as such, and the notion of “intended direc-
tion of behavioural change”. One could argue that each instrument has some kind of goal, but not always is 
this goal a direction of behavioural change (in which case it is implicit). Moreover, directional explicitness 
levels are only directly comparable between instruments with regard to the same goal. To illustrate this, 
one could argue that both the Swiss and the Spanish cases target values explicitly. The Swiss rules target 
the value of personal autonomy, and the Spanish rules target the value of saving a life. The Spanish case is 
more directionally explicit because the ultimate technical goal of the policy in both countries is to save lives 
by acquiring more organs, not to promote personal autonomy.
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directionality) between instruments with different goals, or for a given instrument and its 
several goals.7
Step 3. Valence attribution. An additional question is whether the behavioural change 
is attributed a valence statement: is there also a positive or negative connotation to the 
goal? Beyond the mere—and already validating (Mooney 1999)—fact that certain behav-
iour is explicitly intended, valence attribution refers to the positive or negative meaning 
that policymakers attach to the policy goal in order to encourage addressees to think and 
act along particular lines (Chong and Druckman 2007). For example, the message “donate 
your organs” indicates a direction of behavioural change. “Donate life” additionally attrib-
utes a strong positive meaning to this behavioural change. Like goal framing, valence attri-
bution can influence how addressees process information and evaluate behavioural change, 
for example, whether they perceive this change in terms of gain or loss (Kahneman and 
Tversky 2000; Levin et al. 1998).
While goal definition establishes the presence or absence of explicitness, valence attri-
bution is especially useful in specifying degrees of explicitness. At the minimum both goal 
definition and valence attribution allow us to detect non-explicitness (no goal definition 
and no valence attribution), intermediate explicitness (goal definition but no valence attri-
bution) and high explicitness (goal definition and valence attribution), in either a positive 
or negative direction relative to a given goal.
Explicitness, restrictiveness, formal intensity and density
Not only do non-coercive sermons define goals more or less explicitly, but so do all types 
of policy instruments. Specifying the explicitness of carrots and sticks highlights the con-
ceptual and empirical relationship between the different dimensions of density, formal 
intensity, restrictiveness and explicitness. In order to establish explicitness as a separate 
dimension of policy instruments, I illustrate this relationship and show that explicitness 
can nevertheless vary at comparable levels of density and restrictiveness.
Sticks. Sticks, too, often define goals since they prohibit behaviour or encourage the 
same behaviour; or they can be non-explicit, for example, procedural. A procedural stick 
could create the duty to perform certain formal steps and assign implementing actors, 
while delegating the choice of the objective of these steps and their concrete design 
to the implementing actors (Engeli and Varone 2011).8 One example of a non-explicit 
stick is informed consent: it requires a choice to be made, but leaves the direction of the 
choice completely to the hands of the donor’s relatives. Conversely, the presumed con-
sent model is a more explicit stick than informed consent. It assumes that everyone is a 
potential donor unless the relatives opt out. It formulates organ donation as the intended 
behavioural change, even if it does not impose organ donation (Johnson and Goldstein 
2003). The way in which valence attribution manifests itself depends on the specific 
context of each case. Generally, sticks can attribute positive or negative meaning to 
7 I am grateful to a very helpful reviewer for encouraging me to make this point.
8 One reviewer has rightly noted that some procedural regulations can be quite explicit. For example, 
“safety cultures” can go from the less directionally explicit—“safety is everyone’s business”—to the very 
explicit “one death in the workplace is one too many”. The defining feature of an implicit instrument (of 
any type) is not whether it is procedural, but that it neither specifies a desired direction of behavioural 
change, nor attaches valence to it, with regard to a goal (such as enhancing safety).
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a certain behaviour. For example, the size of the fine for fast driving can indicate the 
importance of traffic accident prevention for a government (Adam et al. 2015).
Carrots. Measuring goal definition is trickier for carrots than for sermons and sticks. 
Other than the latter, incentives and disincentives inherently indicate some direction 
of behaviour and would ideally only be fully non-explicit when absent (Schneider and 
Ingram 1990). Arguably, for carrots, the intentionality of goal definition requires atten-
tion (Knoepfel et  al. 2011; Vedung 1998). For example, relatives of potential organ 
donors face non-material costs of separation if the body has to be transported to a 
retrieval hospital. When designed, this organizational measure was not intended as a dis-
incentive to giving consent, but it clearly needs to be classified as such (Simillis 2010). 
Still, the instrument itself does not explicitly formulate any goal. Hence, non-explicit 
carrots neither purposefully encourage nor purposefully discourage a given behaviour. 
In the field of organ donation, we can think of explicit (positive) incentives as car-
rots encouraging consent: for example, if hospital donor coordinators receive financial 
rewards for recruiting donors. Explicit negative incentives would be carrots that pur-
posefully discourage giving consent to donate organs. Carrots often assign a concrete 
value—material or other—to certain outcomes, implying greater costs or rewards for 
the addressees.
While intertwined, the dimensions of density, substantive and formal intensity, and 
explicitness refer to different aspects of the quantity and quality of state action: just 
as body size and body weight are two distinct but interrelated indicators of someone’s 
physical appearance. This is not a problem of the explicitness concept; it applies equally 
to the relationship between density and restrictiveness. For example, more restrictive 
measures can, but do not have to coincide with a higher density of prohibitions; just as 
heavier people are often, but do not have to be taller than lighter people (Adam et al. 
2015). Equally, however, sometimes regulators add density to regulations to create 
exemptions, leading to less restrictive regulations (Thomann and Zhelyazkova 2017). 
It would be wrong to say that density and restrictiveness are independent—just as body 
size and body weight also correlate—but they are clearly distinct. Similarly, explicit-
ness can sometimes coincide with different degrees of density, formal intensity and the 
ambiguity of goals and tasks, amongst others. Notwithstanding this interrelationship, 
explicitness is a separate analytic dimension of policy instruments, measured via two 
questions: first, does an instrument indicate a desired direction of behavioural change? 
Second, is positive or negative valence attached to this goal? Neither regulatory density 
(quantity of regulation), regulatory restrictiveness (leeway left to regulatees) nor formal 
intensity (efforts to achieve compliance) addresses these questions.
Still, these aspects can sometimes inform explicitness. For example, the amount of 
educational measures can be one indicator that a government attributes high valence to 
behavioural change (e.g. awareness about organ donation). Yet, two countries can have 
a similar density of educational campaigns which still differ in the explicitness with 
which they encourage organ donation. Clearly, the density of output is not identical to 
the explicitness of an instrument. Similarly, if a government prescribes a certain behav-
iour, then it formulates this behaviour as a goal. However, the different models of con-
senting to organ donation also show that instruments can have the exact same level of 
restrictiveness and still differ in their explicitness. Hence, restrictiveness does not equal 
explicitness. Finally, the high cost of non-compliance (e.g. a prison sentence) attaches 
value to certain behaviours. Despite this, this cost could be equally high for two sticks, 
one being merely procedural and the other, highly explicit. Obviously, formal intensity 
is distinct from explicitness.
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Explicitness and nudging
Given its behavioural dimension, one could conclude that explicitness is simply a 
nudge. A nudge “is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour 
in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their eco-
nomic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to 
avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning 
junk food does not” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008: 5). Given this broad definition, “the 
boundaries for qualifying an intervention as a nudge are clearly a little blurred” (Oliver 
2013: 694). Prominent examples of nudges include defaults, information nudges and 
self-control nudges, such as simplification, the use of social norms, increases in ease 
and convenience, disclosure, warnings, precommitment strategies, reminders, eliciting 
implementation intention, and information about the consequences of earlier decisions 
(see John et al. 2011).
Explicitness is an analytic dimension of every policy instrument, regardless of its 
coerciveness and form. Conversely, nudges are certain non-coercive instruments that 
work at the psychological level, and whose goal is typically covert (Oliver 2013) rather 
than explicit. Explicitness is a precise measurable quality of instruments that does not 
yet refer to their effects. Conversely, the concept of a nudge is much fuzzier and mainly 
defines itself through its effect on the regulatees. Clearly, then, explicit policy instru-
ments can—but do not necessarily always—have the form or effects of nudges. For 
example, many argue that an opt-out solution to giving consent to organ donation is a 
nudge. Yet equally clearly, explicitness (as an analytic feature of every policy instru-
ment) and nudges (as specific, non-binding instruments informed by behavioural con-
siderations) are not the same thing.
In summary, the added value of assessing the explicitness of policy instruments lies 
in shedding light on an additional aspect of their content: the degree and quality of goal 
definition. Similar to the notion of nudging, explicitness helps us understand how policy 
instruments shape the decision environment of target groups.
Explicitness and policy outcomes
The degree of goal ambiguity of a policy influences its implementation (Baier et  al. 
1986; Matland 1995). Accordingly, explicitness should help us understand the conse-
quences of policy instruments on target groups. The emerging literature on behavioural 
public policy supports this assertion (John 2016). Policy instruments structure the deci-
sion environment of target groups (Shafir 2013). Governments communicate messages 
of different intensities through policy instruments (Cialdini 2003). The behavioural 
assumption is that individuals are more likely to take action in support of policy goals 
if the goals are promoted by government officials as important (Schneider and Ingram 
1990: 519). The way in which messages are formulated matters, as oftentimes “people 
do not have well-defined preferences for (…) particular questions, (…). Rather, peo-
ple may construct preferences at the time the question is asked” (Johnson et al. 2005: 
S17). For instance, many people prefer to stick to the default set out by governments 
rather than making an active choice (Johnson and Goldstein 2003). The intensity of the 
message can greatly affect how people perceive and respond to policy instruments by 
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changing beliefs about the goal, activating, or altering the priority of existing beliefs 
(Chong and Druckman 2007; Kahneman and Tversky 2000; Nelson et al. 1997; Weaver 
2014).
What can we learn from this literature (see Van der Heijden and Kosters 2015; Oliver 
2015)? Even if target groups may not always respond as desired, explicitness can work as 
one—albeit not the only—aspect of the choice architecture that makes certain behaviours 
more or less likely (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). The degree of explicitness of policy instru-
ments lends more or less credibility to state action. For example, relatives may perceive the 
organ donor request as more authentic if they know that the government’s position is that 
it saves lives (Thomann and Manatschal 2016). Conversely, by not explicitly stating the 
desired direction of behavioural change, non-explicit policy instruments are not designed 
to achieve technical policy goals:
Expectation: Non-explicit policy instruments tend to be less effective than explicit 
instruments in resolving the technical problem.
Research design
A comparison of the Swiss and Spanish organ donation policy illustrates these argu-
ments. The Spanish organ donation system is an example of best practice with the highest 
deceased donor rates worldwide. Conversely, Switzerland “lags behind”: Table 1 illustrates 
that Swiss refusal rates exceeded Spanish rates by 2.5 times in 2009. Furthermore, refusal 
rates differ strikingly between the German-speaking and the French- and Italian-speaking 
(= Latin) regions, and are clearly higher in larger than in smaller hospitals.9 Neither do 
refusal rates differ significantly from region to region nor are refusal rates notably higher 
in larger hospitals in Spain. Hence, different types of hospitals (small vs. large) consti-
tute “nested” cases within two national contexts (Switzerland and Spain) and three regional 
contexts (German-speaking and Latin regions of Switzerland, and Spanish regions).10 This 
design enables me to assess the robustness of my expectation across different value con-
texts (Levi-Faur 2006).
Prior to 2007, organ donation policy in Switzerland was unregulated at the national 
level. In contrast, Spain issued a national Transplantation Act as early as 1979 and 
founded the Organización Nacional de Trasplantes (ONT) in 1989. The Spanish model 
was exported to various countries all over the globe (Matesanz and Dominquez-Gil 2007; 
Matesanz 2008; Quigley et al. 2008). In light of fast-growing waiting lists, the Swiss Trans-
plant Act “copied” the basic elements of the Spanish model—hence all the sermons, car-
rots and sticks are present in both countries. The countries are also comparable in organi-
zational terms. Both organ donation sectors are based on a three-tiered coordination system 
(national, regional, hospital). Each hospital with an intensive care unit (ICU) has at least 
one person responsible for donation and transplantation activities. In addition, religious 
values are translated with similar intensity in both countries (Engeli et al. 2013; Engeli and 
Varone 2012). This similarity, together with identical levels of restrictiveness, facilitates 
identifying different levels of explicitness.
9 Large hospitals have a neurosurgery department, whereas small hospitals generally do not.
10 Since the Spanish Model of organ donation was established before the decentralization of Spain’s health 
care system, it is uniformly implemented in all regions (Manatschal and Thomann 2011: 46).
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Given the novelty of the posited argument, this paper has an explorative and in-
depth focus. To illustrate the link between the degree of explicitness of the policy 
instruments and refusal rates, explanatory typologies are used to complement the qual-
itative case studies to connect different combinations of values of explanatory vari-
ables with particular outcomes (Elman 2005). These patterns are then substantiated 
through the case studies as well as through previous empirical evidence from other 
studies.
Data sources and measurement. Information regarding policy instruments and their 
effects were collected in 2010 for the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH) through 
a qualitative content analysis of primary and secondary literature, and semi-structured 
interviews with a total of 28 experts and practitioners in both countries (Manatschal 
and Thomann 2011; see Table 2). Data on refusal rates stem from the national qual-
ity monitoring programmes. The Spanish sample comprises all hospitals in 2009 (71 
big, 68 small hospitals), whereas data are only available for 50% of the Swiss hospi-
tals. The participant hospitals are considered representative (Manatschal and Thomann 
2011: 33, 64). Finally, the survey question “would you be willing to donate one of your 
organs to an organ donation service immediately after your death?” serves as a proxy 
for values on organ donation. In Spain, a special Eurobarometer was conducted in 
2006 (N = 749) (Eurobarometer 2007). In Switzerland, a representative health survey 
was carried out in 2007 (N = 13304) (Balthasar and Müller 2008). Value polarization 
denotes the difference between the share of positive answers and the share of negative 
answers of all respondents expressing an opinion (excluding “don’t knows”).
Results
Table 1, which presents the substantial content of the two countries’ regulatory regimes, 
offers two important insights.
First, both countries have adopted policy instruments with similar degrees of coer-
civeness, which hence cannot account for the striking differences in refusal rates. Sec-
ond, Spanish hospitals have the most explicit instrument logic, followed by the Swiss 
Latin-speaking ones, and finally the German-speaking hospitals. In line with Howlett and 
Cashore’s (2009) notion of design logics, this pattern begins with the objectives defined by 
the national transplant acts: the Spanish law explicitly aims to encourage voluntary, altru-
istic and non-remunerative organ donation to ensure that every citizen in need of a donor 
organ has optimal chances of receiving one. Conversely, the Swiss law simply seeks to 
regulate the processes of organ donation.
As Fig. 3 illustrates, more explicit policy instruments tend to come with lower refusal 
rates. The case study evidence and other empirical studies highlight the mechanisms under-
lying this link, while also suggesting that explicitness is not the only factor that matters.11 
Large hospitals in Latin-speaking Switzerland deviate from this picture, as discussed 
below.
11 Generally, the comparison between large Swiss German-speaking hospitals and small Swiss Latin-
speaking hospitals suggests that in addition to explicitness, hospital size, reflecting hospital infrastructure 
and more conservative values in rural areas, matters for refusal rates.
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Stick
The legal model of consent is a stick because it obliges the relatives of potential organ 
donors to take a decision (Abadie and Gay 2006). Under presumed consent (opt-out), 
which applies in Spain, everyone is explicitly considered to be a potential donor. Relatives 
must take an active step to express their opposition to a donation. By contrast, Switzer-
land’s informed consent (opt-in) system makes no such explicit assumptions: relatives must 
express their agreement to donating. Neither solution attaches valence to consent.
Legal defaults are often considered recommendations made by governments and are 
considered so powerful that they can “save lives” (Johnson and Goldstein 2003; Johnson 
et  al. 2005). Yet the evidence is most ambiguous regarding this factor. Several studies 
report that presumed consent is positively correlated with higher donation rates (Abadie 
and Gay 2006; Johnson and Goldstein 2003; Mossialos et al. 2008). Others, however, find 
no clearly isolable influence of presumed consent on refusal rates (Bilgel 2012; Mate-
sanz and Dominquez-Gil 2007; Simillis 2010). In their systematic review of the existing 
evidence, Rithalia et  al. (2009: 1) conclude that “presumed consent alone is unlikely to 
explain the variation in organ donation rates between countries”. Instead, a policy regime 
that includes instruments that explicitly support organ donation at all levels is needed. The 
legal model of consent is only one part of this puzzle.
The interviewees had the same core message. The Spanish interviewees pointed 
out that although Spain has had an opt-out solution since 1979, refusal rates only 
decreased after the ONT and the corresponding regime of explicit policy instruments 
Fig. 3  Explicitness and refusal rates. Sources: Manatschal and Thomann (2011); ONT (2009); Swiss 
Donor Action (mean of 2007, 2008, 2009)
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was implemented in 1990. In practice, relatives are always asked for their consent in 
both countries (Quigley et al. 2008: 223). This “reduces the effectiveness of prompted 
choice to increase the number of available organs” (Oliver 2015: 706). The legal model 
mainly influences the concrete wording of the organ donation request, which then inter-
acts with population awareness (Mossialos et al. 2008) and the attitudes of critical care 
staff (Roels et al. 2010) to influence the calibration of the family approach at the hospi-
tal level (Manatschal and Thomann 2011). Overall, the practice of the family request in 
hospitals, to which I turn below, is vastly more important than the recommendation that 
the default entails.
Carrots
Cost coverage and reimbursement of coordinators
Donation processes are specifically funded in Spain, which recognizes the economic 
value of donor recruitment. This is not the case in Switzerland. The Spanish health 
budget covers all procedures preceding the actual organ retrieval within a system of 
advance payment, irrespective of the eventual success of the procedures. Conversely, 
until 2012, cost coverage in Switzerland did not include any procedure preceding organ 
retrieval, such as the donor request, nor did it include cost coverage for situations in 
which an organ was retrieved, but not transplanted. Turning to reimbursement, Spanish 
intensive care unit (ICU) staff and coordinators explicitly receive compensation for their 
work in donation processes (Matesanz 2008: 23) (both goal definition and valence attri-
bution). Conversely, Swiss organ donation coordinators in hospitals (so-called donor 
key persons) are paid part-time for their coordination activities in the Programme Latin 
de Don d’Organes (PLDO) and in large hospitals in German-speaking Switzerland 
(goal definition, considerably less valence attribution than in Spain), but not in small 
German-speaking hospitals (no goal definition, no valence attribution).
Economic resources create incentives for staff to put efforts and expertise into 
recruiting donors. The motivation of the coordinators rests partly on the appropriate 
payment for coordination activities. The Spanish incentive structure works not least due 
to the surgeons’ comparatively low basic salaries (Matesanz and Dominquez-Gil 2007: 
184). Conversely, the lack of explicit financial compensation in small German-speaking 
hospitals is often perceived as a devaluation of the donor coordination function, hence 
working as an (unintended) disincentive for the commitment of the coordinators.
Donor transfer
Transfers to larger hospitals for organ retrieval impose the non-material cost of physi-
cal separation from the beloved deceased on the already traumatized relatives. In Spain, 
mobile teams of surgeons travel to small hospitals for organ retrieval—a measure explic-
itly targeted at avoiding refusals due to donor transfer (Matesanz 2008). Conversely, in 
small Swiss hospitals, about one-third of the donors were transferred to a larger hospi-
tal for retrieval in 2009 (Swisstransplant 2009). This carrot does not entail an explicit 
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valence attribution. Explicitly avoiding donor transfer mediates the concerns of rela-
tives about what will happen with the deceased’s body, and this demonstrably helps 
avoid refusals (Simillis 2010). In contrast, the psychological stress of not being able to 
“say goodbye” is reportedly an important reason why relatives refuse organ donation in 
small Swiss hospitals.
Sermons
Public awareness raising
The ONT promotes donation explicitly and coherently via close media relations, informa-
tion campaigns and frequent education programmes at schools and universities, thus reach-
ing a broad public. Not only is the goal clearly stated, it is positively framed as a way to 
save lives. Conversely, the Swiss law obliges the FOPH to remain strictly neutral in its 
public information campaign (information website, placards, advertisements and non-com-
pulsory teaching materials). Swisstransplant takes a more pro-donation stance, resulting in 
ambiguous messages (BAG 2008; Manatschal and Thomann 2011; Matesanz and Domin-
quez-Gil 2007; Schulz et al. 2006). Explicit awareness-raising campaigns like the Spanish 
ones influence the population’s knowledge of and attitude towards organ donation. This 
reduces possible fears associated with organ donation, which can result in a greater desire 
to donate (Mossialos et al. 2008; Schulz et al. 2006).
Education of hospital staff
In Spain, regional authorities and hospital coordinators systematically and comprehen-
sively educate and make hospital staff aware of organ donation (Matesanz 2008). This 
training includes specific techniques used to communicate the positive aspects of organ 
donation. In Switzerland, the FOPH only selectively supports courses for donor key per-
sons focused on communication with relatives. The PLDO network coordinators occa-
sionally offer additional courses. Overall, Switzerland does educate hospital staff, but this 
education takes a more comprehensive, intensive and positively framed form in the PLDO 
(BAG 2008; Swisstransplant 2008: 7). There is ample evidence that comprehensive educa-
tional programmes for staff indirectly help reduce refusal rates: differences in staff aware-
ness clearly affect the decisions of relatives to donate organs (Roels et al. 2010; Siminoff 
et al. 2001; Simpkin et al. 2009 Indeed, in German-speaking hospitals, the organ donation 
topic was a taboo and was marginalized. Conversely, the network coordinators in Spain and 
the PLDO worked hard to maintain a commitment and motivation to integrate donation 
activities in hospitals.
Family approach (performance of donor request)
In Spain, hospital coordinators are involved in the entire family decision-making process 
and take comprehensive care of the relatives. The family approach in Spain explicitly inte-
grates several techniques aimed at minimizing refusal rates. The donor request is made by 
a different person than the notification of death and is made some time after (personal and 
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temporal decoupling). If the relatives’ initial reaction is negative, the request is repeated 
several times (reapproach). Hence, the Spanish approach is geared towards maximizing 
consent and communicating that consent is something desirable. In Switzerland, the family 
approach is more neutral. The donor key persons are not explicitly responsible for making 
the donor request (BAG 2008). Brain death diagnoses and requests are usually neither tem-
porally nor personally decoupled. The practice of reapproach is negatively perceived and 
never applied (Manatschal and Thomann 2011: 53, 70, 112). This approach does not have 
consent as its explicit goal. The techniques of temporal and personal decoupling and reap-
proach clearly decrease the likelihood of refusal and may lead relatives to reconsider their 
decision if they were initially undecided (Matesanz 2008; Siminoff et al. 2001; Simpkin 
et al. 2009).
Programmes for quality control Finally, national programmes for quality control aim at 
systematically reporting and optimizing organ donation processes. Spain has a compre-
hensive, systematic evaluation programme of the reasons for family refusals, the results of 
which are published to facilitate systematic improvement. The comparison of hospitals has 
resulted in the spread of good practices and a positive validation of “high performers”. In 
contrast, Switzerland runs a voluntary and incomplete programme, which until 2009 neither 
evaluated the causes of family refusals nor published its results. Diminishing refusal rates is 
not its goal. The targeted quality control programme motivated the Spanish interviewees to 
improve their performance, which was not the case in Switzerland.
These results support the assertion that explicitness is influential in structuring the 
decision-making environment for target groups. But what explains the comparatively lower 
refusal rates in large hospitals in Latin-speaking Switzerland despite rather low overall 
levels of explicitness? Apart from the family approach, the three proximate instruments 
that directly impact on the everyday lives of staff and relatives in hospitals are all explic-
itly in favour of consent in the PLDO. Interviewees highlight that the explicit practice of 
reapproach is perceived as extremely intrusive and would work dissuasively in the Swiss 
cultural context. Thanks to their education, the medical staff in these hospitals is better 
skilled to sensitively communicate the donor request than in the other Swiss hospitals. This 
case illustrates that in order to be effective, instruments must be appropriate, and this may 
vary in different contexts (Thomann and Manatschal 2016). This insight raises a number of 
questions.
Explicitness, values and context
It is difficult to think of explicitness without considering the underlying cultural context, 
that is, the values, norms, rules, strategies shared, used and applied in the everyday life of 
people living within a society (Dunkel 2011: 68). Values are relatively stable individual 
preferences regarding desirable end states or motivations. Values guide people’s selec-
tion or evaluation of behaviour and events and express themselves in attitudes (Bilsky and 
Schwartz 1994: 164; Maio and Haddock 2009: 38). As Table 1 shows, German-speaking 
Swiss people have the least organ donation-friendly culture compared to Spain and Latin-
speaking Switzerland (Dunkel 2011; Schulz et al. 2006).12 These cultural differences are 
12 The religious notion that bodily integrity should be maintained is of low importance in both countries 
(Newton 2011).
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rooted in the varying degrees to which death is a taboo topic, the importance of altru-
ism, the “moralization” versus normality of organ donation, the role of community and 
family, and trust in the medical profession (Dunkel 2011; Euchner et al. 2013; Manatschal 
and Thomann 2011; Newton 2011; Schulz et al. 2006). This context affects the adoption 
and effectiveness of policies in general (Studlar and Burns 2015, 288) and the motivations, 
knowledge, and barriers associated with organ donation policy, in particular (Mossialos 
et al. 2008; Simillis 2010).
However, given the striking differences between different types of hospitals in the same 
cultural context, refusal rates are obviously not simply a function of values and the result-
ing attitudes. Table 1 also shows that the basic intention to donate is surprisingly weakly 
related to actual donor decisions (see also Radecki and Jaccard 1999). Despite similar 
levels of willingness to donate (57% of the Spanish, and 53% of the Swiss population in 
2007), actual donor rates vary dramatically and are considerably lower than the levels of 
willingness to donate. Policy instruments influence what happens between the abstract 
intention to donate, and the actual consent to donate.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive answer as to why policy 
instruments display differing degrees of explicitness (see Engeli et al. 2013; Euchner et al. 
2013). In policies that concern fundamental questions such as when life begins or ends, 
each intervention represents a “legal sanction of right and wrong, the validation of a par-
ticular set of basic values” (Mooney 1999: 675). Yet, Table 1 confirms that these values 
themselves do not directly translate into different degrees of explicitness of policy instru-
ments. Conversely, Table 1 lends some support to the assertion that if values within a con-
stituency are highly polarized, then governments may prefer to avoid an explicit position 
(Engeli and Varone 2011).13 However, Knill et al. (2015) also show that many other coun-
tries have highly explicit policy regimes despite high levels of issue contestation.
Undoubtedly, public policies simultaneously reflect prior public attitudes, values and 
morals, and can change the latter (Coleman 1990; Mossialos et  al. 2008: 5–6). Accord-
ingly, “to alter the policy instrumentation not only calls for an expansion of the toolbox, 
but also for a cultural change” (Bagchus 1998: 64). Equally, as the case of large hospitals 
in Latin-speaking Switzerland illustrates, some policy instruments work better than oth-
ers in certain contextual situations. Hence, policy makers need to identify the right instru-
ment in the appropriate context (John 2016). However, the case studies presented here and 
ample scientific research documents the mechanisms underlying the way in which levels of 
explicitness influence refusal rates. Neither of these are simply a function of values.
Discussion
The existing literature recognizes the central role of policy goals for policy instruments 
and emphasizes how policy instruments structure the relationship between the govern-
ment and the governed, but it neglects how instruments structure the decision environ-
ment of target groups. The explicitness dimension captures the messages sent out to citi-
zens by defining the direction of the desired behavioural change (Chong and Druckman 
2007; John 2016; Kahneman and Tversky 2000; Levin et al. 1998; Nelson et al. 1997). 
13 Indeed, we can think of non-explicitness as ambiguity about the goal of an instrument (Matland 1995). 
Ambiguous policies are often chosen to limit conflict because “policy ambiguity allows different groups 
and individuals to support the same policy for different reasons and with different expectations” (Baier et al. 
1986: 206).
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As another aspect of substantial intensity, the explicitness dimension complements the 
traditional focus on instrument density, formal intensity and restrictiveness when think-
ing about the settings and calibration of policy output (Bauer and Knill 2014; Knill et al. 
2012, 2015; Engeli et al. 2013; Hood 2007; Howlett 2009; Sager 2009; Schaffrin et al. 
2015; Vedung 1998).
The findings suggest that the explicitness of governmental messages does affect how 
target groups respond to policy instruments. Individuals appear more likely to support 
policy goals that the state and public actors explicitly promote as important and desir-
able. Differing degrees of explicitness lend credibility and meaning to the context in 
which target group behavioural change takes place (Cialdini 2003; Johnson et al. 2005; 
Schneider and Ingram 1990; Shafir 2013; Thaler and Sunstein 2008; Thomann and 
Manatschal 2016; Weaver 2014). By conceptualizing regulatory regimes as an ensemble 
of instruments that operationalize overarching policy objectives (Howlett and Cashore 
2009), the findings of this study relativize the “power of defaults” (Johnson and Gold-
stein 2003; Johnson et al. 2005). Defaults are only single instruments the effects of which 
depend on the overall policy regime and on how the default is put into practice (Van der 
Heijden and Kosters 2015; Rithalia et al. 2009). Instruments designed to manipulate tar-
get group behaviour might not work as intended if not properly calibrated to the context 
(Oliver 2015).
This explorative study aimed to qualitatively assess how the explicitness concept facili-
tates a deeper understanding of the cases under study (Elman 2005; Levi-Faur 2006). It 
considered the interplay between three key variables of interest but did not provide a com-
prehensive, statistically generalizable explanation that controlled for developments over 
time. Future research should analyse the prevalence, reasons and consequences of explicit-
ness in other contexts and over time so that a causal inference can be drawn. This is impor-
tant because explicitness levels are not a panacea for achieving policy outcomes. Rather, 
they are closely intertwined with the prevailing culture of the population (Coleman 1990). 
Studying explicitness levels helps illuminate the inherent “trade-off between appropriate-
ness and fit of policy instruments” (Bagchus 1998).
Conclusion
Beyond the context of organ donation policy, the explicitness concept can also inform other 
areas such as air pollution regulation. One technical solution to air pollution is that car 
drivers use low-emission vehicles. To achieve this, governments may simply provide infor-
mation about existing carbon dioxide emissions to car buyers (a non-explicit sermon), or it 
could advise them to buy cars with low emissions (an intermediately explicit sermon). This 
message would be highly explicit, for example, if the negative consequences of pollution 
were also highlighted (positive valence of low emissions). Financial incentives for buy-
ing low-emission cars constitute a positive, highly explicit carrot (goal definition and high 
economic value attached); price caps for low-emission cars an intermediately explicit car-
rot (behavioural change is defined but less valence attached), whereas the absence of price 
regulation is a non-explicit carrot (no goal definition, no valence attribution; a de facto dis-
incentive for buyers). Finally, as the case of Volkswagen illustrates, the obligation for car 
producers to test car emissions is a non-explicit stick if the regulator attributes low valence 
to compliance with emission thresholds.
Food safety regulation is another example for differing levels of explicitness (Tho-
mann 2018). For instance, both Germany and the UK have developed information 
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campaigns and voluntary standards for producers to reduce antibiotic resistance in live-
stock production. These sermons explicitly highlight the importance of this objective for 
human health (positive valence attribution). France, Switzerland and Austria also envis-
age the possibility of voluntary written agreements between livestock holders and vet-
erinarians, which would tie simplified access to veterinary drugs with monitoring and 
education requirements (carrot). Yet, only the Austrian agreements explicitly envisage 
the reduced use of antibiotics, and none of them attach value to such a reduction. Finally, 
some countries allow the on-farm manufacture of medicated feed (OFM), again tied to 
several conditions (sticks). Although they vary in their degree of restrictiveness, these 
conditions explicitly aim at avoiding antibiotic residue during OFM (Thomann 2018). 
What this discussion shows is that the explicitness of instruments may vary at simi-
lar levels of restrictiveness, density or formal intensity, while instruments of differing 
restrictiveness may actually be similarly explicit. The question future research should 
tackle is how this affects regulatory outcomes.
Regardless of the policy analysed, the explicitness dimension contributes to capturing 
the calibration and underlying “instrument logics” of policy mixes (Howlett and Cashore 
2009; Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007). Accounting for explicitness also helps conceptual-
ize policy designs that target differing, incoherent goals or goals that are incongruent, that 
is, when instruments do not match the goals (Howlett 2009; Howlett and Rayner 2007). 
Moving beyond both “command and control” and nudging approaches, this article has 
emphasized that explicitness is not specific to one type of instrument; accordingly, infor-
mation instruments, but also binding regulations can be more or less explicit. The explic-
itness of policy instruments has proven more insightful than the coerciveness of policy 
instruments in terms of understanding the empirical cases discussed here. By not account-
ing for degrees of explicitness, researchers might actually overlook an important part of the 
picture behind the emergence, change and effects of policy instruments (Adam et al. 2015; 
Bauer and Knill 2014; Knill et al. 2012; Schaffrin et al. 2015). Including this perspective 
can, therefore, contribute to a better understanding of how governments define and resolve 
problems in their continuous attempt to balance responsiveness to target populations with 
social change.
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